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LEGAL ETHICS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
  
Summary 
 
The Court was asked to decide the appropriate standard for determining when the entire 
Clark County District Attorney’s office should be disqualified for an individual prosecutor’s 
conflict – an appearance-of-impropriety standard or if a more appropriate standard exists. 
 
Disposition 
 
To determine whether the entire district attorney’s office may be disqualified from 
prosecuting a case, the court must determine whether an individual prosecutor’s conflict would 
render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. The conflict may be imputed to the 
entire office in extreme cases and is not determined based on an appearance of impropriety. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Zogheib, the real party in interest, moved to disqualify the Clark County District 
Attorney’s Office because an attorney in the District Attorney’s former law firm represented 
Zogheib in the present case. The district court granted Zogheib’s motion to disqualify after 
several evidentiary hearings showed that the District Attorney was involved in discussions 
regarding the case before his appointment. The District Attorney testified that while he probably 
talked with Zogheib’s attorney or Zogheib before his appointment, he never made an appearance 
on the case, never obtained or reviewed discovery on the case, and never discussed the case with 
the deputy appointed to prosecute the case. Nonetheless, the district court concluded that there 
was a conflict and that the conflict should be imputed to the entire district attorney’s office 
because there was such a great appearance of impropriety that it made it an extreme case 
warranting vicarious disqualification even though the District Attorney had been effectively 
screened from participating in the case.  A petition for a writ of mandamus was then filed. 
 
Discussion 
 
First, the State acknowledged that the DA had a conflict of interest that disqualified him 
from prosecuting Zogheib under Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct (“NRPC”) 1.9 which 
normally imputes all other attorneys in the disqualified attorney's law firm under NRPC 1.10. 
However, this rule does not apply to lawyers working in government offices. Instead, NRPC 1.11 
governs lawyers who are current government officers and employees and "does not impute the 
conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other 
associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to  
screen such lawyers."
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 The Courts primary decision addressing the disqualification of government lawyers was 
issued in 1982 before Nevada adopted the NRPC. In that case
3
, it was held that vicarious 
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 MOD. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.11 cmt. 2 (2012). 
disqualification of a prosecutor's office may be required "in extreme cases where the appearance 
of unfairness or impropriety is so great that the public trust and confidence in our criminal justice 
system could not be maintained without such action." (appearance-of-impropriety standard).  
 The Court rejected this standard for two reasons.  First, it is not implicit in the current 
NRPC. Second, policy arguments favor a test that more narrowly limits the disqualification of 
the DA’s Office: there is a large cost to the county in paying for a special prosecutor; an  
attorney is presumed to perform his ethical duties; and the courts should not unnecessarily 
interfere with the performance of a prosecutor's duties. The broad appearance-of-impropriety 
standard could lead to “unnecessary disqualifications, limit mobility from private to government 
practice, and restrict the assignment of counsel when no breach of confidences has occurred.” 
Consequently, the Court overruled Collier’s appearance of impropriety standard as it applies to 
vicarious disqualification of a prosecutor’s office. 
 Instead, this the district court should ask “whether the conflict would render it unlikely 
that the defendant would receive a fair trial unless the entire prosecutor's office is disqualified 
from prosecuting the case. 
 In this case, the district court reasoned that since the District Attorney was conflicted, as 
head of the office, the entire office must be also.  This ignored that fact that it is the deputies who 
handle the day-to-day operations of the office and make decisions regarding specific cases – 
even though the District Attorney’s name is on every court document. Furthermore, there were 
effective screening measures in place at the district attorney’s office.  
Thus, under either standard, the district court was in error. Applying the Collier standard, 
“no appearance of impropriety existed to such an extent that it would undermine the public trust 
and confidence in the criminal justice system.” Applying the standard adopted in this  
opinion, “there has been no demonstration that the Clark County District Attorney's Office's 
continued participation in the prosecution of Zogheib would render it unlikely that Zogheib 
would receive a fair trial.”  
 
Conclusion 
 
Under the appearance of impropriety standard, rejected by the Court, and even the more 
appropriate standard focusing on whether the defendant would receive a fair trial, the Court 
determined that the district court acted arbitrarily or capriciously by granting the defendant’s 
motion to disqualify the entire Clark County District Attorney’s Office from prosecuting his 
case. The court granted the petition to vacate the defendant’s motion.   
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